Approved For Release 2004/06/15 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000200050045-1

29 August 1977

MEMOR	ANDUM	FOR:
אטמשיו	. AND ON	1 011 .

D/DCI/NI

AD/DCI/NI

25X1

FROM:

EO/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT:

The DCI's Memorandum of 24 August on Structure

of the Intelligence Community

- 1. The unattributed memorandum attached to the DCI's memorandum, "An Order of Magnitude Improvement in Intelligence," strikes me as one written by an individual not all that familiar with the history and problems of finished intelligence analysis. I think it disquieting that the DCI might actually accept its analyses and judgments at face value. Do we need an analytical paper on the real problems; if so, I would be prepared to write one.
- 2. On whether we need a marketing mechanism. While we in the Intelligence Community insist that we work for policy makers, in fact we work for the DCI and his principal lieutenant for substance. Policy makers and their staffs in most circumstances are more interested in information than they are in analysis, which they believe they can do themselves in a fashion quite superior to that of the Intelligence Community and certainly in the political field. It is inherent in the situation that policy makers and their staffs will never praise the Community's analytical product. What impact that product has derives from why the DCI or his lieutenant for production wanted the product prepared and what they used it for. The DCI and his lieutenant might find it handy to have a marketing mechanism help them with their task, but on balance it would seem a marginal enterprise and certainly should be for different purposes than the DCI has raised.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/15 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000200050045-1

- 4. On lateral entry. Obviously bringing new blood in from the academic, think tank and business world can be reinvigorating to any organization. The largest benefit comes when it occurs in a stable organization. It must be recognized that our organization has been in turmoil for over four years and that lateral entry is as apt to be seen by the professionals as a demonstration of lack of trust and of a cutting off of opportunities for advancement as it is a needed infusion of new blood. Most professionals, I believe, would tell us that they need their missions clarified and then given a few years to get some work done.
- 5. On lack of contact with research centers, think tanks and universities. No doubt the situation could be improved, but is there all that much going on in these institutions that is vital to us? Rather is it not essentially cosmetic with the purpose of preventing attack on our products for being parochial?
- 6. A staff unit under production to analyze the management and strategy of our analytical program and how well it is doing. If one believes in management by systems, one could do much in this area. Those who would decide this sould appreciate that implementation would substantially increase the administrative paperwork and divert further resources away from analysis into staff activity.
- 7. Layering. This is the oldest complaint in CIA, except perhaps we have too much editing. Analysts need supervision and who can supervise them except good senior analysts. In my judgment we do not have enough layering.
- 8. Splitting the DDO and DDI. The judgments in the background memorandum about CIA having traditionally been dominated by the DDO are valid. So is the recognition that ill-advised actions by DDO officers have reduced the willingness of academicians to cooperate with the Agency. The consequences of both these facts have not been as severe as portrayed in the background paper. Half the equation is missing. The author apparently has no appreciation of how important it is to the analyst to have access within the same organization to a collection mechanism with personnel and facilities abroad. One should think very carefully about this trade off before making a decision to rend asunder.